

**INFORMATION RESOURCE CENTER
AMERICAN EMBASSY**

**Defense Issues
NATO
Response to Terrorism
May 2005**

N E W S L E T T E R

G o v e r n m e n t D o c u m e n t s

Rice Condemns Alleged Disrespect of Quran at Guantanamo Base, May 12, 2005

[...] There have been recent allegations about disrespect for the Holy Koran by interrogators at Guantanamo Bay and that has deeply offended many people. Our military authorities are investigating these allegations fully. If they are proven true, we will take appropriate action. Respect for the religious freedom of all individuals is one of the founding principles of the United States.

http://www.usembassy.it/file2005_05/alia/a5051204.htm

**U.S., EU Review Cooperation on Terrorist Finance Issues (2005-05-12)
U.S. Mission to the European Union
May 10, 2005**

The United States and the European Union met May 10 in Brussels to review cooperation on terrorism finance issues since the June 2004 U.S.-European Union summit in Dromoland, Ireland, and to discuss the upcoming summit scheduled for June 20 in Washington.

The delegations highlighted progress since the first ad-hoc informal U.S.-EU Troika on terrorism-finance issues, a forum established in September 2004. They undertook to deepen cooperation on the 11 terrorism-finance elements of the Dromoland Declaration on Combating Terrorism and committed to explore new and enhanced initiatives against terrorist financing.

The delegations were chaired by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs E. Anthony Wayne and Deputy Political Director Georges Friden of the Luxembourg Presidency of the European Union.

<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=4C79A2B6-FDE5-40F9-9A79-515E7EE89431>

05AD499 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2004.**United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. April 27, 2005.**

The Department of State submits the Country Reports on Terrorism in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656(f) (the "Act"), which requires the Department to provide Congress with a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. The State Department has focused its own report to Congress on the issues in its mandate, re-named Country Reports on Terrorism: Assessing Countries and Providing Information on Terrorist Groups, rather than the previous Patterns of Global Terrorism publication. As of this year the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) assumes its prescribed role as the "shared knowledge bank" for data on global terrorism. [see entry for NCTC's A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004, ADSURLS Item # XXXX in this edition of EADSURLS.]

The report contains an overview, a chapter on "Global Jihad" and a chapter entitled "Building International Will and Capacity to Counter Terrorism", in addition to the regional and country reports themselves. The report also includes the list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), followed by a list of other selected terrorist groups also deemed of relevance in the global war on terrorism.

Full Report:

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf> [pdf format, 136 pages]

Table of Contents:

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/c14813.htm> [Table of Contents page, sections in pdf format, various pagings]

Congressional Documents (Hearings, reports, etc.)

05AD506 THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS.**Todd M. Masse.****Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated March 24, 2005.**

On August 27, 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order (EO) 13354, National Counterterrorism Center, which established the National Counterterrorism Center and stipulated roles for the NCTC and its leadership and reporting relationships between NCTC leadership and NCTC member agencies, as well as with the White House. [Note: see <http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-20050.pdf> for text of EO 13354.]

In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458. [Note: see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ458.108.pdf for text of P.L. 108-458.] As with the Executive Order 13354, among many other reform initiatives, the act prescribes roles and responsibilities for the NCTC and its leadership.

The purpose of this report is to outline the commonalities and potential differences between EO 13354 and P.L. 108-458, as these conceptual differences could be meaningful in the implementation process of P.L. 108-458 if and when the issue of intelligence reform is re-visited by the 109th Congress. The report examines some aspects of the law related to the NCTC, including the relationship between the NCTC's Director and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which may have implications related to policy and implementation of an effective and efficient nationally-coordinated counterterrorism function. The report also examines several issues that may be of interest to Congress as the NCTC matures and evolves, including potential civil liberties

implications of collocating operational elements of the traditional foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence entities of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32816.pdf> [pdf format, 19 pages]

05AD491 IMMIGRATION: TERRORIST GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS.

Michael John Garcia Ruth Ellen Wasem.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated March 30, 2005.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) spells out a strict set of admissions criteria and exclusion rules for all foreign nationals, whether coming permanently as immigrants (i.e., legal permanent residents) or temporarily as non-immigrants. Notably, any alien who has engaged in or incited terrorist activity, is reasonably believed to be carrying out a terrorist activity, or is a representative or member of a designated foreign terrorist organization is inadmissible.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the INA was broadened to deny entry to representatives of groups that endorse terrorism, prominent individuals who endorse terrorism, and spouses and children of aliens who are removable on terrorism grounds (on the basis of activities occurring within the previous five years). The INA also contains grounds for inadmissibility based on foreign policy concerns.

The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) concluded that the key officials responsible for determining alien admissions (consular officers abroad and immigration inspectors in the United States) were not considered full partners in counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11, 2001, and as a result, opportunities to intercept the September 11 terrorists were missed.

This report opens with an overview of the grounds for inadmissibility and summarizes key legislation enacted in recent years. The section on current law explains the legal definitions of “terrorist activity,” “terrorist organization,” and other security-related grounds for inadmissibility and analyzes the legal implications of these provisions. The report then discusses the alien screening process to identify possible terrorists during the visa issuance process abroad and the inspections process at U.S. ports of entry. Where relevant, the report also discusses how recently enacted legislation — the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P. L. 108-458) — affects these matters. The authors also review provisions in: the Real ID Act (H.R. 418), introduced in the 109th Congress by House Committee on the Judiciary Chairman James Sensenbrenner, passed by the House on February 10, 2005, and passed on March 12, 2005 as part of the FY2005 supplemental appropriations for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, reconstruction in Afghanistan and other foreign aid (H. R. 1268).

[Note: See latest version of H.R. 418 at:

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h418rfs.txt.pdf]

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32564.pdf> [pdf format, 19 pages]

05AD489 DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: STATUTORY AUTHORITIES. [RS22112]

Richard A Best, Jr.; Alfred Cumming; and Todd Masse

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. April 11, 2005.

In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in late 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community since its establishment

over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to manage the Intelligence Community. Some observers have questioned whether the new statute provides the DNI the necessary authorities to effectively manage the various elements within the Intelligence Community. It is clear that the DNI's authorities are substantially stronger than those held by the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), but whether the DNI has sufficient management authority to implement mandated reforms will depend on several factors. They include:

- * The DNI's determination to assert his new powers;
- * The extent to which the DNI receives presidential and congressional support, and;
- * The DNI's ability to successfully establish a transparent intelligence budget process that will permit him to make and effectively enforce informed budget decisions. This suggests close and continuous congressional oversight of the reform process.

On March 17, 2005, President Bush forwarded to the Senate the nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to fill the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). [Note: On April 21, 2005, Ambassador Negroponte was confirmed as the DNI by the U.S. Senate on a 98-2 vote.]

<http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/intel/RS22112.pdf> [pdf format, 6 pages]

05AD479 EUROPEAN VIEWS AND POLICIES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST. [RL31956]

Kristin Archick.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated March 9, 2005.

Managing policy differences on a range of issues emanating from the Middle East poses serious challenges for the United States and its European allies and friends. The most vitriolic dispute has centered on the conflict in Iraq. However, divisions over how best to approach the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, manage Iran and Syria, and combat terrorism also persist. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress are concerned that continued disagreements between the two sides of the Atlantic could both constrain U.S. policy choices in the region and erode the broader transatlantic relationship and counterterrorism cooperation over the longer term. The U.S.-initiated Broader Middle East and North Africa partnership project seeks to encourage reforms in the region and U.S.-European cooperation in tackling Mideast problems.

Many analysts assert that the United States and Europe share common vital interests in the Middle East: combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; promoting Middle East peace and stability; ensuring a reliable flow of oil; and curtailing Islamic extremism. U.S. and European policies to promote these goals often differ considerably. Although the European governments are not monolithic in their opinions on the Middle East, European perspectives have been shaped over time by common elements unique to Europe's history and geostrategic position.

Many Europeans believe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be a priority. They view it as a key driver of terrorism, Islamic extremism, and political unrest among Europe's growing Muslim populations. In contrast, the U.S. Administration stresses that terrorism and weapons proliferation are the primary threats and must be pro-actively confronted; peace and stability in the region will not be possible until these twin threats are removed. A number of other factors, such as divergent perceptions of the appropriate role of the use of force and growing European Union (EU) ambitions to play a larger role on the world stage, also contribute to the policy gaps that have emerged.

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31956.pdf> [pdf format, 33 pages]

05AD473 THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS.**Carol Migdalovitz.****Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated April 12, 2005.**

Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic goal throughout the years of conflict since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. On April 30, 2003, the United States, the U.N., European Union, and Russia (the Quartet) presented a "Roadmap" to Palestinian statehood within three years. It has not been implemented.

On April 11, 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and President Bush met at the President's ranch in Crawford, Texas. The President conveyed his "concern that Israel not undertake any activity that contravenes Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations. Therefore, Israel should remove unauthorized outposts and meet its Roadmap obligations regarding settlements in the West Bank." He said that there is "no expansion of settlements" under the Roadmap. Mr. Bush strongly supported Israel's plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip as a means of building confidence. He repeated that "new realities on the ground make it "unrealistic" to think that a final settlement would lead to a return to 1949 borders, but this was to be agreed with the Palestinians. For his part, Sharon restated his support for a democratic Palestinian state with territorial contiguity and his position that Israel would proceed with the Roadmap only after the Palestinians act against terror. He again promised that Israel would remove unauthorized outposts. Sharon stated, "It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli population centers will remain in Israel's hands under any final status agreement" and declared that Ma'ale Adumim (3 miles east of Jerusalem in the West Bank) is a major population center and, therefore, Israel is interested in contiguity between it and Jerusalem.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB91137.pdf> [pdf format, 19 pages]

05AD516 THE RISE OF CHINA AND ITS EFFECT ON TAIWAN, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA: U.S. POLICY CHOICES. [RL32882] Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery.**Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. April 12, 2005.**

The rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as an economic powerhouse has brought significant changes in China's relationships with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The interests of all four of these governments are being influenced by the rapid development of trade, investment, and financial flows. Relationships among them arise primarily out of the self interests of businesses and operate largely independently of government intervention (except for government regulation, ownership of enterprises, and financing). Many of these economic flows are generated by the forces of globalization that are affecting all parts of the world.

This report maintains that some of the primary concerns with respect to rising Chinese economic power and the growing trade and investment network in northeast Asia are these:

* China's so-called "peaceful rise" is occurring below the radar screen for many policymakers. China seems to be taking advantage of a "distracted America" to build relationships with other countries that could have far-reaching effects on U.S. interests and strategy.

* The growth of the Chinese economy is so rapid and broad-based that it has the potential of fundamentally altering national interests among countries. * China is displacing the United States as the primary trading partner for many Asian countries. China's market has become so extensive that Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have all joined the Chinese-based economic network rather than try to work against it. While the U.S. market will always be a major export destination, Japan, South Korea,

and Taiwan have progressively turned toward China for imports and exports, and their companies increasingly are dividing their manufacturing processes to take advantage of lower costs in China.

* The progressively large economic and financial relationships between China and its neighbors in northeast Asia is altering the cost-benefit calculus of military action that might cause instability in the region. The economic costs of instability are rising. Each is being induced to seek stability, although the PRC is adamant in preventing Taiwan's independence.

* China's growing economy provides the resources for Beijing to modernize its military, and it is expected, before too long, to be able to tip the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait in its favor. Once that occurs, China may be willing to sacrifice external peaceful relations to accomplish other national goals — such as forced reunification with Taiwan.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32882.pdf> [pdf format, 40 pages]

The White House

The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report To The President, March 31, 2005

The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was established by Executive Order 13328, which was signed by the President on February 6, 2004. The Commission is charged with assessing whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn in a timely manner of, and to support United States Government efforts to respond to, the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century and their employment by foreign powers (including terrorists, terrorist organizations, and private networks).

“In short, to succeed in confronting today's and tomorrow's threats, the Intelligence Community must be transformed--a goal that would be difficult to meet even in the best of all possible worlds. And we do not live in the best of worlds. The CIA and NSA may be sleek and omniscient in the movies, but in real life they and other intelligence agencies are vast government bureaucracies. They are bureaucracies filled with talented people and armed with sophisticated technological tools, but talent and tools do not suspend the iron laws of bureaucratic behavior. Like government bodies everywhere, intelligence agencies are prone to develop self-reinforcing, risk averse cultures that take outside advice badly. While laudable steps were taken to improve our intelligence agencies after September 11, 2001, the agencies have done less in response to the failures over Iraq, and we believe that many within those agencies do not accept the conclusion that we reached after our year of study: that the Community needs fundamental change if it is to successfully confront the threats of the 21st century”.

<http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html>

Think Tank Publications

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine

By Thomas Donnelly

Posted: Wednesday, April 27, 2005

The gap between America's strategic reach and its military grasp has reached a point of crisis, argues veteran defense analyst Thomas Donnelly in this comprehensive study of the U.S. armed forces needed in the post-9/11 world.

In the four years since al Qaeda's catastrophic attacks against America, President Bush has put forward an ambitious slate of foreign policy goals, pledging to transform the political culture of the greater Middle East and preserve America's place in the world as the sole superpower. In practice, the "Bush Doctrine" has meant a host of new missions for the U.S. military, from the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns of the global war on terror to the military containment of the People's Republic of China. These are missions, however, that America's armed forces are not sufficiently prepared to pursue.

As the Pentagon prepares its 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review—the crucial strategy paper that will shape the U.S. military for years to come—the Bush administration must confront tough choices about how transform America's defense establishment for the challenges now confronting it. In this book, Donnelly offers an innovative and provocative blueprint for gauging the success of this endeavor.

Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow in defense and security policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

Full text available in Adobe Acrobat PDF format.

http://www.aei.org/books/bookID.819,filter.all/book_detail.asp

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

05AD513 ON THE GROUND: PROTECTING AMERICA'S ROADS AND TRANSIT AGAINST TERRORISM.

Arnold M. Howitt and Jonathan Makler.

Brookings Institution. Web-posted April 26, 2005.

The U.S. federal government, states, and localities have spent considerable funds on transportation security since September 11, 2001. The authors note that only a small percentage of that funding has addressed needs outside of the air travel system and equipment for the "first responders" of public safety agencies. However, from 1991 to 2001, 42 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide have targeted surface transportation systems - rail systems or buses. This report examines the regulatory, financial, and logistical landscape of surface transportation security, making policy recommendations while counseling decision-makers to weigh carefully the

trade-offs between accessibility and security.

The report reviews some of the initiatives in place in state and local jurisdictions, and explores options for increasing local means for protecting surface transportation.

http://apps49.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20050426_howitt.pdf [pdf format, 20 pages]

The United States and Europe at the NPT Review Conference

U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, May 2005

Michael A. Levi, Nonresident Science Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies

The United States and the states of Europe occupy a special place in the nuclear world. They include three official nuclear weapons states and a host of others under the protection of NATO's nuclear umbrella. They produce sixty-five percent of the world's nuclear power, and include major developers and exporters of nuclear technology. They are acutely threatened by the twin prospects of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. And perhaps uniquely amongst nations, their combined political, economic, and military power presents them the opportunity to effectively confront these challenges.

Indeed, despite frequent discord, the United States and its European partners share a raft of common goals and more consensus on methods for achieving them than is often realized. When they attend the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, to be held at the United Nations from May 2 to May 20, 2005, they will all find much more in common with each other than they will with most of the rest of the world. They will be most successful in achieving their goals if they work together to promote common solutions in areas of shared interest—and there are many. They will also do well to be wary of potential splits—particularly on Iran and the Middle East—and invest in efforts to ensure that their combined strength is not sapped by charged but isolated disagreement.

<http://www.brook.edu/fp/cuse/analysis/levi20050505.htm>

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

South Asian Seesaw: A New U.S. Policy on the Subcontinent

Ashley J. Tellis Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Policy Brief No.38. May 2005

The widely noted decision to resume F-16 sales to Pakistan and, even more, the largely ignored commitment to assist India's growth in power represent a new U.S. strategy toward South Asia. By expanding relations with both states in a differentiated way matched to their geostrategic weights, the Bush administration seeks to assist Pakistan in becoming a successful state while it enables India to secure a troublefree ascent to great-power status.

These objectives will be pursued through a large economic and military assistance package to Islamabad and through three separate dialogues with New Delhi that will review various challenging issues such as civil nuclear cooperation, space, defense coproduction, regional and global security, and bilateral trade. This innovative approach to India and Pakistan is welcome—and long overdue in a strategic sense—but it is not without risks to the United States, its various regional relationships, and different international regimes.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16919>

CATO INSTITUTE

Flying the Unfriendly Skies: Defending against the Threat of Shoulder-Fired Missiles**by Charles V. Peña****Charles V. Peña is director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute.****Policy Analysis no. 541 April 19, 2005**

Shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, or MANPADS (man-portable air defense systems), have proliferated throughout the world. They can be purchased on the military arms black market for as little as \$5,000. More than two dozen terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, are believed to possess such weapons. The FBI estimates that there have been 29 MANPADS attacks against civilian aircraft resulting in 550 deaths. At least 25 of the reported attacks have been attributed to non state actors.

Even though a U.S. airliner has not been attacked by a missile, the question well may be when, not if, such an attack will happen. Therefore, the federal government should act now to provide protection for civilian aircraft instead of waiting to respond to an attack. The need to act beforehand is particularly acute because, although the human death toll would likely be less than on September 11, 2001, the economic consequences of an attack could be enormous. According to one estimate, the total economic loss resulting from an attack could be as high as \$70 billion.

After 9/11 the public could eventually be coaxed back into flying by assurances that the government and airlines were taking security precautions to prevent more hijackings. But if even a single airliner is shot down by a missile, public confidence will not be easily restored. The harsh reality is that ground security to defend against MANPADS is nearly impossible.

The U.S. government should take advantage of available technology currently used on military aircraft to protect the U.S. commercial aircraft fleet. The cost to outfit all 6,800 U.S. commercial aircraft with advanced laser-jamming infrared countermeasures against MANPADS is estimated at \$11 billion plus \$2.1 billion in recurring annual operating costs. In 2004 Citizens Against Government Waste documented a total of \$22.9 billion in federal pork-barrel spending—more than twice what's needed to procure the countermeasures against shoulder-fired missile attacks. Canceling the Air Force's F-22, the Navy's F/A-18E/F, the Marine Corps' V-22, and the Navy's Virginia-class submarine would yield savings of \$170 billion in future program costs. The president's proposed federal budget for fiscal year 2006 is \$2.6 trillion. Certainly, the U.S. government can find needless spending equal to less than one-half of 1 percent of its budget to help fulfill its primary responsibility of providing for the common defense.

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3734

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION (CDI)

Nuclear Terrorism Convention: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism**Steven C. Welsh. May 6, 2005**

The UN General Assembly on April 13, 2005, adopted by consensus an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism ("Nuclear Terrorism Convention"), addressing the unlawful possession

or use of nuclear devices or materials by non-state actors. The Nuclear Terrorism Convention is the first anti-terrorist convention since Sept. 11, 2001, and calls for states parties to develop appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate alleged offenses, and, as appropriate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite offenders. It also calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions, with respect to information-sharing as well as extradition and the transfer of detainees to provide assistance with foreign investigations and prosecutions. With much of its focus on legal action against individuals, the treaty also sets out a number of provisions relating to the treatment of detainees.

<http://www.cdi.org/news/law/ntc.cfm>

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

Iraq's Evolving Insurgency

Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies

With the Assistance of Patrick Baetjer

Working Draft: Updated as of May 12, 2005

Tensions planted in Iraq during the regime of Saddam Hussein were aggravated by key strategic errors of the U.S.-led coalition, exacerbating rifts in the country and increasing the insurgency threat, according to a new report by Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy. The report outlines the historical roots of the insurgency and its evolution as well as U.S. missteps.

<http://www.csis.org/>

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Power-Sharing in Iraq

David L. Phillips

Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Center for Preventive Action

Council on Foreign Relations, April 25, 2005

While Iraq's elections were a watershed in the country's history, the real fight for power will be over Iraq's permanent constitution. This fight is just getting under way.

(...) The report examines hot-button issues such as ownership of Iraq's energy wealth, disarming militias, the status of Kirkuk, individual and group rights, and the role of Islam in Iraqi governance. It also outlines roles for the United States and the United Nations.

http://www.cfr.org/pub8033/david_l_phillips/powersharing_in_iraq.php

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

05AD496 A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM FOR 2004.

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) via the website of the Federation of American Scientists

(FAS). April 29, 2005.

The report consists of a brief description of 651 “significant international terrorist incidents” in 2004, in chronological order, from an incident in Kashmir on January 1 to a terrorist incident on December 30, also in Kashmir. The last few pages provide basic statistics and charts.

The NCTC originally compiled this chronology to support the Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, which formerly filled the State Department’s reporting requirements under Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). However, since the State Department now files another publication, Country Reports on Terrorism [see ADSURLS Item # XXXX in this edition of EADSURLS] in lieu of the Patterns publication, this chronology was no longer needed. Nonetheless, the NCTC decided to release it so that the public could have the data contained therein.

Note: The NCTC advises that the chronology “should not be viewed as a complete accounting of global terrorist activity. The categorization and selection criteria specified to NCTC for filtering incidents were drawn from statutory language, traditional Patterns of Global Terrorism definitions, and past practices. The methodology used to generate this list of incidents, however, does not accurately capture the totality of terrorist incidents worldwide and could lead to anomalous and potentially inaccurate results. NCTC will therefore adjust and improve this methodology and follow this release with the distribution, in June 2005, of a more comprehensive dataset, with regular updates, to better inform the public.”

<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2004.pdf> [pdf format, 92 pages]

05AD482 CUBA: REVIEW OF FIDEL CASTRO SPEECHES, 2005.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), via the website of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Web-posted April 22, 2005.

These are very brief summaries of eighteen of President Castro’s speeches since January 2005 to the present. The full addresses themselves run from just under two hours to five hours each. Most of the summaries presented here note Castro’s repeated references to Venezuela as well as the United States. There is at least one pejorative reference to the Organization of American States (OAS). Among Castro’s targets is Mexico, which he criticizes for its vote at the UN Commission on Human Rights, as well as Mexico’s “failure to investigate known terrorist Luis Posada Carriles.”

<http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/04/fidel2005.html> [html format, 4 printed pages]

GERMAN MARSHALL FUND

**Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: Strengthening European and Transatlantic Commitments Joerg Forbrig and Robin Shepherd, editors
May 2, 2005**

Ukraine's recent Orange Revolution opens an enormous opportunity to reinvigorate the democratic reform process in that country and to bring it closer to European and transatlantic structures. A new book just released by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, jointly with the Heinrich Boell Foundation of Germany, brings together renowned experts from Ukraine, Europe, and the United States to look more closely and systematically into the steps needed to take advantage of this opportunity both domestically and internationally.

Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. Strengthening European and Transatlantic Commitments represents one outcome of a strategic dialogue on Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic community initiated by the German Mar-

shall Fund and the Heinrich Boell Foundation before Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections, elections which proved so crucial for Ukraine's democratic development. This dialogue, bringing together policymakers and analysts from Ukraine, Europe, and the United States, concluded with a session just one week after the inauguration of Ukraine's new and freely elected president, Viktor Yushchenko, in January 2005.

<http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=100>

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Who's On First? A Strategy for Protecting Critical Infrastructure

by Alane Kochems

Backgrounder #1851 May 9, 2005

Over 85 percent of the critical infrastructure (CI) in the United States is controlled by the private sector.[1] The USA PATRIOT Act defines critical infrastructure as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of these matters.

While protecting critical infrastructure has always been a U.S. concern, the urgency has increased in recent years. With so much critical infrastructure under private control, delineating exactly which responsibilities for protecting it should be exercised by private entities and which should be carried out by the federal government has been difficult.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1851.cfm>

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution

Asia Report N°97 . 4 May 2005

The March 2005 popular revolt ended President Askar Akaev's increasingly authoritarian fourteen-year rule and gave political and economic progress a chance. However, the new leaders face significant obstacles. If the situation is mishandled, and people conclude nothing has changed except the names at the top, Kyrgyzstan could become seriously unstable.

(...)The ouster of Akaev should not have been entirely unexpected. He had not only lost popular support, but also was increasingly losing the backing of key national and regional elites, who were irritated at family control of the economy and rising corruption. There had been many warnings[1] that unfair elections could create a climactic crisis, but Akaev and his aides had become complacent about their ability to manipulate and suppress opposition.

Akaev failed to develop key state institutions. When protests started in the wake of parliamentary elections in February, it was quickly clear the state was weak, and few elites were willing to defend the president. At the end, the regime collapsed in a few hours.

As they prepare for presidential elections in July 2005, Kyrgyzstan's new leaders face critical challenges that risk undermining the country's important step toward real democracy:

- the need for political reform, particularly to redress imbalances created by Akaev's centralisation of power in the presidency and the weakness of state institutions;
- a looming economic crisis that could be worsened by tax collection problems and weak administration;
- a crisis over land seizures, squatters and enduring problems with land tenure; and
- the growing security risk from criminal groups with economic and political power.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3411&l=1>

**North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?
Asia Report N°96
25 April 2005**

Despite the deepening nuclear confrontation between North Korea and the world, the North is undergoing the most profound economic changes since the founding of the state 57 years ago. It is unclear if the regime is capable of fully embracing the market; the final outcome cannot be predicted, and no major new economic engagement should be attempted until the nuclear issue is resolved. Nevertheless, the international community has an opportunity to increase the chances that North Korea will make a successful transition from a Stalinist command economy to one that is more market-driven and integrated into the global economy. Facilitating its economic reforms remains the best strategy for pushing the North towards more acceptable international conduct. There are some important preliminary steps not involving the transfer of meaningful resources that ought to be undertaken immediately both in order to prepare for what should be done if a nuclear deal is struck and to show Pyongyang why it needs to make that deal in its own interest.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3388&l=1>

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

**05AD497 ESTIMATIVE PRODUCTS ON VIETNAM, 1948-1975. [NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES]
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (ODCI), National Intelligence Council (NIC). Web-posted April 29, 2005.**

The 38 documents on this site and the complete 174 documents in the entire collection show how the US intelligence Community viewed critical developments over a 27-year period, ranging from analysis of the implications of the post-World War II breakup of colonial empires to the Communist takeover of Saigon in 1975. A number of these documents were declassified and published in other circumstances, but many are being made public here for the first time. As such, they undoubtedly will be of immense interest and value to historians and scholars, academics and diplomats, and comprise in sum a unique historical record of a challenging and controversial chapter in U. S. foreign relations.

[Note: The entire collection of 174 declassified Vietnam-related intelligence estimates are available for searching or browsing at: http://www.foia.cia.gov/nic_vietnam_collection.asp, but the collection of 38 documents at the site noted below may provide sufficient detail for most researchers.]

http://www.odci.gov/nic/foia_vietnam_content.html [Table of Contents page, original documents in pdf format, various pagings]

NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (NTI)

05AD507 SECURING THE BOMB: THE NEW GLOBAL IMPERATIVES.

Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier.

Harvard University, Project on Managing the Atom; Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). May 5, 2005.

This new report calls for a fast-paced global partnership to secure all nuclear stockpiles worldwide. Meeting that objective, it says, will require “sustained leadership and political heavy lifting” from Presidents Bush and Putin and their counterparts around the world.

The report outlines three essential elements of this vital global effort:

- * Accelerating and strengthening the effort in Russia, where the largest stockpiles of potentially vulnerable materials still exist;
- * Removing the material entirely from the world’s most vulnerable sites; and
- * Building a fast-paced global coalition to improve security for the remaining nuclear stockpiles around the world.

The authors offer detailed recommendations to strengthen current international efforts. The report also calls for specific steps that the G8’s Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction should take, leading up to their meeting in Scotland in July; recommendations for actions by the current Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference; and options for action by the U.S. Congress. The report urges President Bush to “appoint a senior full-time White House official, with the access needed to walk in and ask for presidential action when needed, to lead these efforts, to keep them on the front burner at the White House every day, to set priorities, to eliminate gaps and overlaps, and to seize opportunities for synergy.”

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

http://www.nti.org/e_research/report_cnwmupdate2005.pdf [pdf format, 140 pages]

or: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/thebomb2005.pdf

RAND

05AD502 APTITUDE FOR DESTRUCTION, VOLUME 2: CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN FIVE TERRORIST GROUPS.

Brian A. Jackson with John C. Baker, Kim Cragin, John Parachini, Horacio R. Trujillo and Peter Chalk. Web-posted April 26, 2005.

The authors prepared a set of case studies of organizations that have used terrorism as a component of their violent activities. They selected five organizations for these case studies:

- * Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult that pursued chemical and biological weapons;
- * Hizballah is a social and political movement with insurgent and terrorist aims and activities;
- * Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a smaller, better defined terrorist group linked to and influenced by the global jihadist movement;

- * Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is a traditional ethnic terrorist group with a long operational history;
- * The Radical Environmentalist Movement, focusing on terrorist activities claimed by organizations identified as the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front, among others, is an example of a much less-defined terrorist “front” of a broader ideological movement. To focus on learning behaviors, the authors chose terrorist groups that have a reputation for innovative activities. The report outlines three strategies to improve efforts to combat terrorism by focusing on group learning activities:
 - * Detection of terrorist groups' efforts to change and adapt. This involves identifying, extracting, and interpreting key information about terrorist groups' adaptive efforts from the constant stream of intelligence.
 - * Strengthening the ability of intelligence and law enforcement organizations to anticipate whether terrorists will be successful in their learning efforts. Although any effort by a terrorist group to acquire new weapons or capabilities is a concern, the threat posed by the group only increases if its learning efforts are successful. An understanding of group learning processes provides better ways for intelligence and law enforcement analysts to assess group efforts and better anticipate the likely outcomes of group efforts to adapt.
 - * Limiting or undermining terrorist groups' ability to learn and thereby evolve over time. Potential actions include limiting a terrorist group's access to information, technologies and weapons; targeting a group's “learning leadership;” identifying and breaking connections among group members; and denying groups a safe haven for experimentation and adapting strategies. Employing deception, misinformation, and other psychological techniques can also be used to shape the learning processes of terrorist groups, steering their actions and ultimately affecting their outcomes.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG332.pdf [pdf format, 216 pages]

05AD501 APTITUDE FOR DESTRUCTION, VOLUME 1: ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN TERRORIST GROUPS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR COMBATING TERRORISM.

Brian A. Jackson with John C. Baker, Kim Cragin, John Parachini, Horacio R. Trujillo and Peter Chalk. Web-posted April 26, 2005.

This report is the first of a two-volume analysis of the innovation and learning processes of five groups of terrorists: Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the radical environmental movement, and Islamic organizations Hezbollah and Jemaah Islamiyah. According to this study, a deeper understanding of how terrorists learn can provide insight into how they acquire and use new weapons and tactics, sharpen member skills, collect and use intelligence, and adapt to a constantly changing world. By anticipating how and where groups evolve over time, intelligence and law enforcement officials can adjust their counterterrorism measures accordingly, the report says.

When a terrorist group can learn—and learn well—it can act systematically to fulfill its needs, strengthen its capabilities, and advance its strategic agenda. The ability to learn allows a terrorist group to purposefully adapt to ever-evolving circumstances by:

- * Developing, improving, and employing new weapons or tactics that can enable it to change its capabilities over time.
- * Improving its members' skills in applying current weapons or tactics.
- * Collecting and utilizing the intelligence information needed to mount operations effectively.
- * Thwarting countermeasures and improve its chance of surviving attempts to destroy it.

* Preserving the capabilities it has developed even if some of its members are lost The authors warn that a “terrorist group’s ability to learn is therefore a primary determinant of the level of threat it poses, since learning is the route through which organizations can seek solutions to the problems that bound their freedom of action and limit their ability to pursue their goals in changing operational and security circumstances.”

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Report:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG331.pdf [pdf format, 106 pages]

Summary:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG331.sum.pdf [pdf format, 12 pages]

05AD484 AUM SHINRIKYO, AL QAEDA, AND THE KINSHASA REACTOR IMPLICATIONS OF THREE CASE STUDIES FOR COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM.

Sara A. Daly, John V. Parachini and William Rosenau.

Web-posted April 20, 2005.

Revelations about A.Q. Khan’s global nuclear marketing efforts and Osama bin Laden’s contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists have raised concerns about terrorist acquisition of a nuclear or radiological weapons capability. Such a capability would pose a grave danger to U.S. national security and to the security of the international system of nation-states. This study suggests that strict controls on nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise will reduce opportunities for terrorists to acquire these resources.

The authors selected three cases for analysis. Although other terrorist groups in the past have shown interest in acquiring nuclear materials and devices, the two groups examined in this study, Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, have demonstrated a commitment unmatched by other organizations. The case of the disappearance of nuclear fuel rods from a reactor in Zaire illustrates what might be termed the “supply side” of the nuclear market and illustrates the pathways that terrorists or criminals might follow to obtain nuclear material. As with the two other cases explored here, the authors used available open source material, although in many instances this information provided only a fragmentary and tentative account.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Report:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.pdf [pdf format, 89 pages]

Summary:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.sum.pdf [pdf format, 7 pages]

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

05AD518 THE TRANSATLANTIC DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: RESTRUCTURING SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS.

Terrence R. Guay.

United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). April 2005.

This report argues that cooperation between U.S. and European industrial bases would provide greater benefits for both, but that there are currently deep divides between the defense sectors on either side of the Atlantic. Opportunities for the construction of a transatlantic defense sector are tangible, but significant obstacles may

accelerate the formation of a bipolar industrial base. Guay says that while market forces played a key role in the transformation and consolidation of these sectors in recent years, political considerations are largely responsible for a restructuring process that has been almost entirely among U.S. firms in the United States and among European Union companies in Europe. He examines the forces that have shaped the restructuring of the U.S. and European defense industries since the end of the Cold War, and presents factors that will influence further restructuring and consolidation in the short- and medium-terms. He contends that a transatlantic defense industrial base is preferable to a bipolar one, and recommends that the U.S. Government open its defense equipment market to more European firms, and that European governments reciprocate. Additionally, military forces should put greater effort into coordinating procurement requirements and needs, and firms should explore expanding transatlantic links.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/PUB601.pdf> [pdf format, 40 pages]

05AD477 DISMANTLING NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS.

David J. Bishop.

United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). April 2005.

This report examines the choices available to the United States for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. The options range from doing nothing to executing policies of engagement, containment, or preemption. Each option has advantages and disadvantages, and there are numerous factors influencing the problem. The major factors include U.S. national interests, the role of China, the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance, the difficult nature of North Korea, and the U.S. war on terror.

The author argues that "The optimal course of action is not one policy in particular, but a combination of engagement and containment. Furthermore, preemptive action will invite foreign policy disaster for the United States and should only be used as a last resort. Specific policy recommendations to improve implementation of a hybrid policy of engagement and containment include strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, supplementing multilateral talks with bilateral talks, offering a formal security guarantee to North Korea, broadening the Proliferation Security Initiative to include China, and improving national intelligence capabilities. If preemption must be used, says Bishop, national leaders must know what conditions would trigger that decision, and they must prepare in advance the necessary protocol for warning and informing friends, allies, and other concerned parties.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/PUB599.pdf> [pdf format, 20 pages]

American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment

Dr. Stephen D. Biddle

Monograph, April 2005

In the three years since 9-11, the Administration has yet to arrive at a clear definition of the enemy or the aim in the War on Terrorism; to date, American policy has combined ambitious public statements with ambiguity on critical particulars. Heretofore, the costs of pursuing such ambitious but ill-defined goals have been high but tolerable. The ongoing insurgency in Iraq, however, is increasing the costs of grand strategic ambiguity to the point where fundamental choices can no longer be deferred. There are two broad alternatives for resolving these ambiguities and creating a coherent and logically sufficient grand strategy: rollback and containment. Rollback would retain the ambitious goals implicit in today's declaratory policy and accept the cost and near-term risk inherent in pursuing them. Containment would settle for more modest goals in exchange for lower costs and lower near-term risks. Neither alternative dominates the other on analytical grounds – both involve

serious costs as well as benefits. Most important, the choice between them turns on a series of basic value judgments on the acceptability of risk, the relationship between near-term and long-term risk, and the ultimate degree of security the Nation should seek.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=603>

Transformation and Strategic Surprise

Dr. Colin S. Gray

Monograph, April 2005

The current process of military transformation will enable the Armed Forces to do better what they already do superbly well. It is important to excel at decisive maneuver and in the application of precise, yet overwhelming firepower. But those attributes, though key in warfare against regular enemies, tend to be less valuable in conflict with irregulars. In war after war, the United States has been surprised by the poor political reward it has earned for its military effort. The IT-led transformation will do nothing to help correct the persisting American difficulty in functioning strategically and politically in its conduct of war. The author develops a cumulative seven-point argument.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=602>

The Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base: Restructuring Scenarios and Their Implications

Dr. Terrence R. Guay

Monograph, April 2005

Opportunities for the construction of a transatlantic defense sector are tangible, but significant obstacles may accelerate the formation of a bipolar industrial base. While market forces played a key role in the transformation and consolidation of these sectors in recent years, political considerations are largely responsible for a restructuring process that has been almost entirely among U.S. firms in the United States and among European Union companies in Europe. In this monograph, Dr. Terrence Guay examines the forces that have shaped the restructuring of the U.S. and European defense industries since the end of the Cold War, and presents factors that will influence further restructuring and consolidation in the short- and medium-terms. He contends that a transatlantic defense industrial base is preferable to a bipolar one, and recommends that the U.S. Government open its defense equipment market to more European firms, and that European governments reciprocate. Additionally, military forces should put greater effort into coordinating procurement requirements and needs, and firms should explore expanding transatlantic links.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=601>

UNITED NATIONS

05AD488 THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM.

United Nations General Assembly. April 13, 2005.

This Convention aims to strengthen the global legal framework to counter terrorist threats. Based on a pro-

posal by the Russian Federation in 1998, the Convention focuses on criminal offences related to nuclear terrorism and covers a broad range of possible targets, including nuclear reactors as well as nuclear material and radioactive substances.

Under its provisions, alleged offenders - for example any individual or group that unlawfully and intentionally possesses or uses radioactive material with the intent to cause harm - must be either extradited or prosecuted. States are also encouraged to cooperate with each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings. The Convention further requires that any seized nuclear or radiological material be held in accordance with IAEA safeguards, and handled in keeping with the IAEA's health, safety and physical protection standards. The Convention opens for signature in September this year.

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/unga040405_csant.pdf [pdf format, 14 pages]

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq SPECIAL REPORT 134 April 2005

"Who Are the Insurgents?" offers insight into the breadth of Sunni Arab groups actively participating in the insurrection in Iraq and specifically examines the three broad categories of insurgents: secular/ideological, tribal, and Islamist. With the exception of the ultraradical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists, this report finds, many rebels across these three classifications share common interests and do not sit so comfortably in any one grouping or category. This presents specific problems—and opportunities—for U.S. and coalition forces that, if handled correctly, could eventually lead to a rapprochement with some of the insurgents.

The report's author, [Amatzia Baram](#), is a professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa, Israel. He is a prolific writer and editor of several books and dozens of scholarly articles on Saddam Hussein and Iraqi politics and history. He testified about Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction in September 2002 before the House Committee on Government Reform, and before the House Committee on Armed Services in April 2004. He has also consulted about Iraq with senior U.S. administration officials. He is a former Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. This report is based on a chapter in a book he is currently writing about the relationship between Islam and the state in modern Iraq.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr134.pdf>

05AD476 THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY'S EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC SECURITY IN IRAQ: LESSONS IDENTIFIED.

[USIP Special Report No. 139]

Robert M. Perito.

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). April 2005.

The author contends that in planning for postconflict operations, senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials assumed that coalition forces would inherit a fully functioning state with its institutions intact. Gen. (ret.) Jay Garner and the staff of the Pentagon's Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Affairs (ORHA) presumed the Iraqi police and the regular Iraqi army would remain on duty, assume responsibility for security, and maintain public order. Instead, says Perito, "the Iraqi police and all government authority simply vanished

when the U.S. Army's Third Infantry Division reached the center of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. He sums up the situation facing the U.S. military when they seized control of Baghdad in this way: "Without the assistance of Iraqi security personnel, U.S. military forces were unprepared to deal with the outburst of civilian violence and destruction that followed their arrival. The small number of U.S. troops in Baghdad did not view looting as a military threat and had no orders to interfere, especially since U.S. military forces were still engaged in combat elsewhere. Lack of U.S. response to the looting created a situation of impunity that shocked Iraqis and encouraged continued lawlessness. Commanders explained that civil administration and postwar reconstruction were the responsibility of Gen. Garner and his staff. Security conditions, however, prevented Garner and a small advance team from reaching Baghdad until April 21, twelve days after U.S. forces arrived in the city." The report contains a number of recommendations regarding public order, street crime, border control, and police recruitment, training, and combat. Perito draws parallels between the Iraq engagement and Operation Just Cause in Panama at the end of 1989, which he finds in many ways remarkably similar.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr137.pdf> [pdf format, 16 pages]

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